So let us return to the problem. The person who can rightly say what emotional or passional responses are appropriate (or inappropriate) with respect to any given object, person, or any natural or human event is he who is “within the Tao.” And what, now, is the sense of “within”? Recall that we have these two questions to answer: (a) “Who is to say what emotional or passional responses are appropriate or inappropriate with respect to any given natural object, person, or any natural or human event?” and (b) “Who is within the Tao?” The two possibilities when the sense of “knowing” is the same in answer to both questions have already been mentioned, but a brief reiteration of each will clarify things.
1. The first way of trying to understand what it means to be “within the Tao” is like this: If we understand the first question to be asking, “Who knows what the appropriate emotional responses are to any given object, person, or event?”; and if we answer the second question in the same way, “The person within the Tao is the one who knows what the appropriate emotional responses are to any given object, person, or event,” then we get nowhere. The person who knows what the appropriate emotional responses are to any given object, person, or event is the person who knows what they are. This is nonsense.
2. The second way of trying to understand what it means to be “within the Tao” is like this: If we take the first question to be asking, “Who actually has the emotional response appropriate to any object, person, or event—e.g., the waterfall?”; and if we answer the question “Who is within the Tao?” using this same sense of “within” (“The person within the Tao is the person who actually has the appropriate emotional responses to something like the waterfall, responses such as awe, humility, and veneration”), then, again, the logical circularity becomes apparent: the only ones who know what “to be within the Tao” really means are those who really know what it means to be within the Tao. This, too, is nonsense.
These two possibilities—both of which are attempts to understand the expression “within the Tao” without distinguishing between the two different kinds of knowing—end up in a logical circularity and in nonsense. Clever nonsense, but nonsense nonetheless.
So it looks as if the only way to avoid the self-contradictory nature of the answers is to understand them as employing both senses of knowing: one sense in the first question, and the other sense in the second question. So now let us try to understand the problem using a combination of these two senses of knowing. There are two possibilities here:
3. Let us take the sense of knowing in answer to the first question—“Who really knows what emotional or passional responses are appropriate (or inappropriate) with respect to any given object, person, or event?”—as having the appropriate or “true” emotional response to objects, persons or events. And let us take the sense of knowing in answer to the second question—“And who is within the Tao?”—as knowing what those appropriate responses are. In this case a person is “within the Tao” when he knows what the appropriate emotional or passional responses are in (nearly) all cases, even though he may not have them. Indeed, he might have the true or correct affections only very rarely. But his being within the Tao will enable him to see this about himself. And, of course, he will also see what the appropriate emotional or passional responses he ought to have upon recognition of his dearth of true or appropriate passions: he ought to be pained by it, and feel remorseful, ashamed, and humbled. Of course, he may not actually have these responses either. But this lack of proper emotion or passion cannot be complete; it cannot go “all the way down,” as it were. If such a person’s passions are so weak or misdirected as not to feel any sorrow or remorse in light of the recognition of his own weak or misdirected passions, then we can hardly say that he is still “within the Tao.” In short, being “within the Tao” cannot be solely an intellectual condition. Such a person would be “insanely reasonable” (Chesterton calls such a one a “Maniac”). At the most fundamental level, there must be a love for the Tao, a basic affection for truth and goodness and beauty. No one lacking this can be said to live “within the Tao.”
Nevertheless, it is clear that this condition—knowing what emotions and passions one ought to have while not actually having them—is an accurate description of a great many of us. We see the ideal, and, in seeing it, we also see how far we are from it.
Now let’s look at the last possible combination.
4. Let us suppose the sense of knowing in answer to the first question—“Who really knows what emotional or passional responses are appropriate (or inappropriate) with respect to any given natural phenomena, natural or human event, or person?”—as having the appropriate or “true” emotional response to objects, persons or events. And let us take the sense of knowing in answer to the second question—“And who is within the Tao?”—as knowing what those appropriate responses are. In this case a person is “within the Tao” when he has the appropriate emotional or passional responses in (nearly) all cases, even though he may not know what they ought to be; i.e., he may not be able to say, with any specificity or clarity, what they ought to be, nor articulate any sort of rationale for why they are appropriate. Indeed, such a person might not be able to give any sort of account of true and right emotion, even though they (nearly) always have it. Such a person would be like a pure and innocent child. Their “accounting” would be their own way of life. (Think of Dostoevsky’s Prince Myshkin in The Idiot.) Like the previous sense of knowing, this avenue also has its limiting case: if the appeal is to be human, it must include an appeal to the intellect. At some level there must be something immanently reasonable about right and true emotion, even for those whose intellect is undeveloped or limited. In order to be an ideal, the notion must be distinguishable, and it is with the intellect that distinctions are made.
Both of these latter combinations (3 and 4) avoid the self-contradictory nature of the first two, and either of them is enough to ensure that the nihilist cannot squirm out of Lewis’ critique without being inhuman. Either one closes the logical loophole through which the nihilist might try to escape.
Now, which one is better?
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